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Abstract
One of us has recently elaborated a theory for modelling concepts that uses the state context property
(SCoP) formalism, i.e. a generalization of the quantum formalism. This formalism incorporates context
into the mathematical structure used to represent a concept, and thereby models how context influences
the typicality of a single exemplar and the applicability of a single property of a concept, which provides
a solution of the Pet-Fish problem and other difficulties occurring in concept theory. Then, a quantum
model has been worked out which reproduces the membership weights of several exemplars of concepts
and their combinations. We show in this paper that a further relevant effect appears in a natural
way whenever two or more concepts combine, namely, entanglement. The presence of entanglement
is explicitly revealed by considering a specific example with two concepts, constructing some Bell’s
inequalities for this example, testing them in a real experiment with test subjects, and finally proving
that Bell’s inequalities are violated in this case. We show that the intrinsic and unavoidable character
of entanglement can be explained in terms of the weights of the exemplars of the combined concept with
respect to the weights of the exemplars of the component concepts.
Keywords: Concept combination, Bell’s inequalities, entanglement, quantum cognition
1 Introduction
Understanding the mechanism of how concepts combine to form sentences and texts so that it is possible
to communicate meaning among human minds is one of the major challenges in the psychological studies
on human thought. None of the existing theories on concepts explains however ‘how concepts combine’.
This combination problem was manifestly revealed by Hampton’s experiments [1, 2] which measured the
deviation from classical set theoretic membership weights of exemplars with respect to pairs of concepts
and their conjunction or disjunction. Hampton’s investigation was motivated by the so-called Guppy effect
in concept conjunction found by Osherson and Smith [3]. These authors considered the concepts Pet and
Fish and their conjunction Pet-Fish, and observed that, while an exemplar such as Guppy was a very typical
example of Pet-Fish, it was neither a very typical example of Pet nor of Fish. Hence, the typicality of a
specific exemplar with respect to the conjunction of concepts shows an unexpected behavior from the point
of view of classical set and probability theory. As a result of this work, the problem is often referred to as
the Pet-Fish problem and the effect is usually called the Guppy effect. Hampton identified a Guppy-like
effect for the membership weights of exemplars with respect to pairs of concepts and their conjunction
[1], and equally so for the membership weights of exemplars with respect to pairs of concepts and their
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disjunction [2]. Several experiments have since been performed (see, e.g., [4]) and many approaches have
been propounded to solve the Pet-Fish problem (see, e.g., fuzzy set based theories [5, 6, 7]) and to provide
a satisfactory mathematical model of concept combinations (see, e.g., explanation based theories [8, 9, 10]).
But none of the currently existing concept theories provide a satisfactory description or explanation of such
effects [4, 9, 10].
Inspired by a formalism providing an operational foundation of quantum mechanics [11, 12, 13, 14], one
of the authors has elaborated, together with some co-workers, a State Context Property (SCoP) formalism
to model and represent concepts [15, 16, 17, 18]. In the SCoP formalism each concept is associated with
well defined sets of states, contexts and properties. Concepts change continuously under the influence
of a context and this change is described by a change of the state of the concept. For each exemplar
of a concept, the typicality varies with respect to the context that influences it. Analogously, for each
property, the applicability varies with respect to the context. This implies the presence of both a contextual
typicality and an applicability effect. The Pet-Fish problem is solved in the SCoP formalism because in
different combinations the concepts are in different states. In particular, in the combination Pet-Fish
the concept Pet is in a state under the context The Pet is a Fish. The state of Pet under the context
The Pet is a Fish has different typicalities, which explains the Guppy effect. On the basis of the SCoP
formalism, a mathematical model using the formalism of quantum mechanics in Hilbert space has been
worked out which allows one to reproduce the experimental results obtained by Hampton on conjunctions
and disjunctions of concepts. This formulation identifies the presence of typically quantum effects in the
mechanism of combination of concepts, e.g., contextual influence, superposition, interference, emergence,
etc. [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25].
In this paper we show that another relevant effect which is usually considered as characteristic of
quantum mechanical entities, that is, entanglement, is present whenever two or more concepts combine.
The presence of entanglement is explicitly revealed by considering two concepts, i.e. Animal and Acts, and
their combination The Animal Acts, together with some exemplars Horse, Bear, Tiger, Cat (for Animal)
and Growls, Whinnies, Snorts, Meows (for Acts), and constructing some Bell’s inequalities in the version
derived by Clauser, Horne, Shimony and Holt [26] (Sec. 2). We then test these Bell’s inequalities in a
real experiment with 81 test subjects and analyze the obtained data (Sec. 3). The experiment shows a
significant violation of Bell’s inequalities, hence it proves the entanglement between the concepts Animal
and Acts when they form the sentence The Animal Acts (by the term entanglement we actually mean the
presence of nonclassical correlations violating Bell’s inequalities, without reference to any mathematical
representation in Hilbert spaces). Moreover, we compare the obtained data with the results that would
have been obtained if context and meaning had not influenced the subjects’ minds. In the latter case,
indeed, Bell’s inequalities are not violated, hence their violation in our experiment shows that meaning and
context play a basic role in the combination of concepts. We finally provide an explanation of the origins
and ubiquity of entanglement in combined concepts in terms of weights of the exemplars of the combined
concept with respect to the weights of the exemplars of the component concepts (Sec. 4).
We conclude this section by observing that the potentially fundamental role played by entanglement in
word association was pointed out by Nelson and McEvoy and Bruza et al. in [27, 28]. In [29] it is shown
that if one assumes that words can become entangled in the human mental lexicon, then one can provide
a unified framework in which two seemingly competing approaches for modeling the activation level of
words in human memory, namely, the Spreading Activation and the Spooky-activation-at-a-distance, can
be recovered.
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2 Detecting entanglement between concepts
We illustrate in this section how entanglement appears in a natural way whenever two or more concepts
combine. To this aim, we analyze here an example with two concepts and a combination along the lines
put forward in [16, 17, 18].
We regard the sentence The Animal Acts as a conceptual entity, hence as a combination of the concepts
Animal and Acts. Then, we show the presence of entanglement between these two concepts by testing
Bell’s inequality with respect to them. We consider two couples of exemplars or states of the concept
Animal, namely Horse, Bear and Tiger, Cat, and also two couples of exemplars or states of the concept
Acts, namely Growls, Whinnies and Snorts, Meows – for our experiment we specifically consider forms of
actions, hence exemplars of Acts, which consists of possible animal sounds, hence exemplars of Making A
Sound. Our first experiment A consists in test subjects choosing between the two exemplars Horse and
Bear to answer the question ‘is a good example of’ the concept Animal, and we put E(A) = +1 if Horse
is chosen, hence the state of Animal changes to Horse, and E(A) = −1 if Bear is chosen, hence the state
of Animal changes to Bear, introducing in this way the function E which measures the ‘expectation value’
for the test outcomes concerned. Our second experiment A′ consists in test subjects choosing between the
two exemplars Tiger and Cat to answer the question ‘is a good example of’ the concept Animal, and we
consistently put E(A′) = +1 if Tiger is chosen and E(A′) = −1 if Cat is chosen to introduce a measure of
the expectation value. The third experiment B consists in test subjects choosing between the two exemplars
Growls and Whinnies to answer the question ‘is a good example of’ the concept Acts, with E(B) = +1
if Growls is chosen and E(B) = −1 if Whinnies is chosen. The fourth experiment B′ consists in test
subjects choosing between the exemplars Snorts and Meows to answer the question ‘is a good example of’
the concept Acts, with E(B′) = +1 if Snorts is chosen and E(B′) = −1 if Meows is chosen.
Let us now consider coincidence experiments in combinations AB, A′B, AB′ and A′B′ for the conceptual
combination The Animal Acts. Concretely, this means that, for example, test subjects taking part in the
experiment AB, to answer the question ‘is a good example of’, will choose between the four possibilities
(1) The Horse Growls, (2) The Bear Whinnies – and if one of these is chosen we put E(AB) = +1 – and
(3) The Horse Whinnies, (4) The Bear Growls – and if one of these is chosen we put E(AB) = −1. For the
coincidence experiment, A′B subjects, to answer the question ‘is a good example of’, will choose between
(1) The Tiger Growls, (2) The Cat Whinnies – and in case one of these is chosen we put E(A′B) = +1 – and
(3) The Tiger Whinnies, (4) The Cat Growls – and in case one of these is chosen we put E(A′B) = −1. For
the coincidence experiment, AB′ subjects, to answer the question ‘is a good example of’, choose between
(1) The Horse Snorts, (2) The Bear Meows – and in case one of these is chosen we put E(AB′) = +1 –
and (3) The Horse Meows, (4) The Bear Snorts – and in case one of these is chosen we put E(AB′) = −1.
And finally, for the coincidence experiment, A′B′ subjects, to answer the question ‘is a good example of’,
will choose between (1) The Tiger Snorts, (2) The Cat Meows – and in case one of these is chosen we put
E(A′B′) = +1 – and (3) The Tiger Meows, (4) The Cat Snorts – and in case one of these is chosen we put
E(A′B′) = −1. We can now evaluate the expectation values E(A′, B′), E(A′, B), E(A,B′) and E(A,B)
associated with the coincidence experiments A′B′, A′B, AB′ and AB, respectively, and substitute them
into the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt variant of Bell’s inequality [26]
− 2 ≤ E(A′, B′) + E(A′, B) + E(A,B′)− E(A,B) ≤ 2. (1)
From the well-known analysis of Bell’s inequality follows that in case the experimental expectation values
violate Eq. (1), a local and classical probabilistic description is not possible, and entanglement exists
between the given concepts. Thus, by the sentence Animal is entangled with Acts we mean the experimen-
tal fact that these two concepts exhibit nonclassical correlations, without referring to any mathematical
representation in Hilbert spaces. The connections with entangled states in tensor product Hilbert spaces
will be outlined in Sec. 4.
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We note that the maximum violation of the Bell’s inequality in Eq. (1) occurs when the quantity
E(A′, B′) + E(A′, B) + E(A,B′) − E(A,B) is equal to +4, that is, when the outcome for each one of the
members of this expression is +1, +1, +1 and -1, respectively. Let us make an intuitive analysis of the
situation such that we can see why Bell’s inequality will most probably be violated for our experiment.
In the coincidence experiment AB, both The Horse Whinnies and The Bear Growls will yield rather high
scores, with the two remaining possibilities The Horse Growls and The Bear Whinnies being chosen little.
This means that we will get E(A,B) close to -1. On the other hand, in the coincidence experiment A′B
one of the four choices will be prominent, namely The Tiger Growls, while the three other possibilities,
The Cat Whinnies, The Tiger Whinnies, and The Cat Growls, will be much less present amongst the
choices made by the test subjects. This means that we have E(A′, B) close to +1. In the two remaining
coincidence experiments, we equally have that only one of the choices is prominent. For A,B′, this is The
Horse Snorts, with the other three The Bear Meows, The Horse Meows and The Bear Snorts being much
less present. For A′B′, the prominent choice is The Cat Meows, while the other three The Tiger Snorts,
The Tiger Meows and The Cat Snorts are much less present. This means that we have E(A,B′) is close to
+1 and E(A′, B′) is close to +1. Coming to the expectation values, we hence can expect that Eq. (1) be
violated, and that case (ii) occurs such that the existence of entanglement between the considered concepts
would be proven.
One of us has recently shown [30] that Eq. (1) is violated in the concept combination The Animal Acts
by using the World Wide Web as a conceptual domain. In the next section we will show that a violation
occurs also when the data are collected from a real experiment with test subjects following the standard
procedure of psychology experiments in concept research.
3 Description of the experiment
The entanglement mentioned in the foregoing section was tested in an experiment where 81 participating
subjects were presented with a questionnaire to be filled out accompanied by the following text:
This study has to do with what we have in mind when we use words that refer to categories, and more
specifically ‘how we think about examples of categories’. Let us illustrate what we mean. Consider the
category ‘fruit’. Then ‘orange’ and ‘strawberry’ are two examples of this category, but also ‘fig’ and ‘olive’
are examples of the same category. In each test of the questionnaire you will be asked to pick one of the
examples of a set of given examples for a specific category. And we would like you to pick that example that
you find ‘a good example’ of the category. In case there are more than one example which you find a good
example, pick then the one you find the best of all the good examples. In case there are two examples which
you both find equally good, and hence hesitate which ones to take, just take then the one you slightly prefer,
however slight the preference might be. It is mandatory that you always ‘pick one and only one example’,
hence in case of doubt, anyhow pick one and only one example. This is necessary for the experiment to
succeed. So, one of the tests could be that the category ‘fruit’ is given, and you are asked to pick one of the
examples ‘orange’, ‘strawberry’, ‘fig’ or ‘olive’ as a good example, and in case of doubt the best of the ones
you doubt about, and in case you cannot decide, pick one anyhow. Let all aspects of yourself play a role in
the choice you make, ratio, but also imagination, feeling, emotion, and whatever.
Let us now examine the obtained results.
For the coincidence experiment AB, 4 subjects chose the example The Horse Growls as a good example
of the combination The Animal Acts, 5 subjects chose The Bear Whinnies, 51 subjects chose The Horse
Whinnies, and 21 subjects chose The Bear Growls. This means that on a totality of 81 test subjects
we get fractions of 4, 5, 51 and 21 for the different combinations considered. This allows us to calculate
the probability for one of the combinations to be chosen. We have P (A1, B1) = 4/81 = 0.0494 for The
Horse Growls, P (A2, B2) = 21/81 = 0.2593 for The Bear Whinnies, P (A1, B2) = 51/81 = 0.6296 for
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The Horse Whinnies and P (A2, B1) = 5/81 = 0.0617 for The Bear Growls. Knowing these probabilities,
we can again calculate the expectation value for this coincidence experiment by means of the equation
E(A,B) = P (A1, B1) + P (A2, B2) − P (A2, B1) − P (A1, B2) = −0.7778. We calculate the expectation
values E(A′, B), E(A,B′) and E(A′, B′) in an analogous way. For the coincidence experiment A′B, 63
subjects chose the example The Tiger Growls as a good example of the combination The Animal Acts,
4 subjects chose The Cat Whinnies, 7 subjects chose The Tiger Whinnies, and 7 subjects chose The Cat
Growls. This gives P (A′
1
, B1) = 0.7778, P (A
′
2
, B2) = 0.0494, P (A
′
1
, B2) = 0.0864 and P (A
′
2
, B1) = 0.0864,
hence E(A′, B) = 0.6543. For the coincidence experiment AB′, 48 subjects chose the example The Horse
Snorts as a good example of the combination The Animal Acts, 7 subjects chose The Bear Meows, 2
subjects chose The Horse Meows, and 24 subjects chose The Bear Snorts. This gives P (A1, B
′
1
) = 0.5926,
P (A2, B
′
2
) = 0.0864, P (A1, B
′
2
) = 0.0247 and P (A2, B
′
1
) = 0.2963, hence E(A,B′) = 0.3580. For the
coincidence experiment A′B′, 12 subjects chose the example The Tiger Snorts as a good example of the
combination The Animal Acts, 54 subjects chose The Cat Meows, 7 subjects chose The Tiger Meows, and
8 subjects chose The Cat Snorts. This gives P (A′
1
, B′
1
) = 0.1481, P (A′
2
, B′
2
) = 0.6667, P (A′
1
, B′
2
) = 0.0864
and P (A′
2
, B′
1
) = 0.0988, hence E(A′, B′) = 0.6296. For the expression appearing in the Clauser-Horne-
Shimony-Holt variant of Bell’s inequalities, we get
E(A′, B′) +E(A′, B) + E(A,B′)− E(A,B) = 2.4197 (2)
which is manifestly greater than 2, hence it violates Bell’s inequalities and reveals entanglement between
the concept Animal and the concept Acts.
The above violation of Bell’s inequalities constitutes our main result in this paper and we will exhaus-
tively comment on it in the next section. But we first want to consider Bell’s inequalities under different
perspectives.
Suppose that there are two separated sources of knowledge, e.g., two test subjects, and consider the
coincidence experiment AB. Let P (A1) be the probability that the first subject choose the exemplar Horse
as a good example of the concept Animal, let P (B1) be the probability that the second subject choose
the exemplar Growls as a good example of the concept Acts, and let us estimate the probability that the
example The Horse Growls be a good example of the conceptual combination The Animal Acts as the
product P (A1)P (B1), that is, as the joint probability Pprod (A1, B1) that the first subject choose Horse and
the second subject choose Growls. By referring to the experimental data that have been collected we have
P (A1) = 43/81 = 0.5309, P (B1) = 39/81 = 0.4815, Pprod (A1, B1) = P (A1)P (B1) = 0.2556. Analogously,
we can calculate the probability that The Bear Whinnies be a good example of The Animal Acts as the
product of the probability P (A2) that the first subject choose Bear as a good example of Animal times
the probability P (B2) that the second subject choose Whinnies as a good example of Acts. We find from
empirical data P (A2) = 38/81 = 0.4691, P (B2) = 42/81 = 0.5185, hence Pprod (A2, B2) = P (A2)P (B2) =
0.2433. By proceeding in an analogous way we calculate the probability that The Horse Whinnies be a
good example of The Animal Acts as the product of the probability P (A1) that the first subject choose
Horse as a good example of Animal times the probability P (B2) that the second subject chooseWhinnies as
a good example of Acts. We find Pprod (A1, B2) = P (A1)P (B2) = 0.2753. Furthermore, if we calculate the
probability that The Bear Growls be a good example of The Animal Acts as the product of the probability
P (A2) that the first subject choose Bear as a good example of Animal times the probability P (B1) that the
second subject choose Growls as a good example of Acts, we find Pprod (A2, B1) = P (A2)P (B1) = 0.2259.
The expectation value is Eprod (A,B) = Pprod (A1, B1) + Pprod (A2, B2) − Pprod (A2, B1) − Pprod (A1, B2) =
−0.0022. Let us now consider the coincidence experiment A′B. The probability that the first subject choose
the example Tiger as a good example of Animal is P (A′
1
) = 59/81 = 0.7284, while the probability that
the first subject choose Cat as a good example of Animal is P (A′
2
) = 22/81 = 0.2716. If we calculate the
probability that The Tiger Growls be a good example of The Animal Acts as the product of the probability
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P (A′
1
) that the first subject choose Tiger as a good example of Animal times the probability P (B1) that
the second subject choose Growls as a good example of Acts, we find Pprod (A
′
1
, B1) = P (A
′
1
)P (B1) =
0.3507. Analogously, we find Pprod (A
′
2
, B2) = P (A
′
2
)P (B2) = 0.1408, Pprod (A
′
1
, B2) = P (A
′
1
)P (B2) =
0.3777, Pprod (A
′
2
, B1) = P (A
′
2
)P (B1) = 0.1308. The expectation value is Eprod (A
′, B) = Pprod (A
′
1
, B1) +
Pprod (A
′
2
, B2)−Pprod (A
′
2
, B1)−Pprod (A
′
1
, B2) = −0.0169. Let us come to the coincidence experiment AB
′.
The probability that the second subject choose the example Snorts as a good example of Acts is P (B′
1
) =
26/81 = 0.3210, while the probability that the second subject choose Meows as a good example of Acts is
P (B′
2
) = 55/81 = 0.6790. If we calculate the probability that The Horse Snorts be a good example of The
Animal Acts as the product of the probability P (A1) that the first subject choose Horse as a good example
of Animal times the probability P (B′
1
) that the second subject choose Snorts as a good example of Acts, we
find Pprod (A1, B
′
1
) = P (A1)P (B
′
1
) = 0.1704. Analogously, we find Pprod (A1, B
′
1
) = P (A2)P (B
′
2
) = 0.3185,
Pprod (A1, B
′
1
) = P (A1)P (B
′
2
) = 0.3605, Pprod (A1, B
′
1
) = P (A2)P (B
′
1
) = 0.1506. The expectation value is
Eprod (A,B
′) = Pprod (A1, B
′
1
) + Pprod (A2, B
′
2
) − Pprod (A2, B
′
1
) − Pprod (A1, B
′
2
) = −0.0221. Finally, let us
consider the coincidence experiment A′B′. If we calculate the probability that The Tiger Snorts be a good
example of The Animal Acts as the product of the probability P (A′
1
) that the first subject choose Tiger
as a good example of Animal times the probability P (B′
1
) that the second subject choose Snorts as a good
example of Acts, we find Pprod (A
′
1
, B′
1
) = P (A′
1
)P (B′
1
) = 0.2338. Analogously, we find Pprod (A
′
2
, B′
2
) =
P (A′
2
)P (B′
2
) = 0.1844, Pprod (A
′
1
, B′
2
) = P (A′
1
)P (B′
2
) = 0.4946, Pprod (A
′
2
, B′
1
) = P (A′
2
)P (B′
1
) = 0.0871.
The expectation value is Eprod (A
′, B′) = Pprod (A
′
1
, B′
1
) + Pprod (A
′
2
, B′
2
) − Pprod (A
′
2
, B′
1
) − Pprod (A
′
1
, B′
2
) =
−0.1635. The ‘product’ expectation values Eprod (A,B), Eprod (A
′, B), Eprod (A,B
′) and Eprod (A
′, B′) can
then be put into the Bell inequality, which gives
Eprod (A
′, B′) + Eprod (A
′, B) + Eprod (A,B
′)− Eprod (A,B) = −0.2003. (3)
This result is very different from the earlier obtained expression, and also does not violate Bell’s inequalities.
The reason for this is that in the case of ‘separated sources of knowledge’, the non-violation of Bell’s
inequalities is structural [30]. This statement can be proved as follows.
Lemma. If x, x′, y and y′ are real numbers such that −1 ≤ x, x′, y, y ≤ +1 and S = xy + xy′ + x′y − x′y′
then −2 ≤ S ≤ +2.
Proof. Since S is linear in all four variables x, x′, y, y′, it must take on its maximum and minimum
values at the corners of the domain of this quadruple of variables, that is, where each of x, x′, y, y′ is +1
or -1. Hence at these corners S can only be an integer between -4 and +4. But S can be rewritten as
(x+ x′)(y + y′)− 2x′y′, and the two quantities in parentheses can only be 0, 2, or -2, while the last term
can only be -2 or +2, so that S cannot equal -3, +3, -4, or +4 at the corners.
Since in the situation considered we have Pprod(Ai, Bj) = P (Ai)P (Bj), Pprod(A
′
i, Bj) = P (A
′
i)P (Bj),
Pprod(Ai, B
′
j) = P (Ai)P (B
′
j) and Pprod(A
′
i, B
′
j) = P (A
′
i)P (B
′
j), we get E(A,B) = E(A)E(B), E(A
′, B) =
E(A′)E(B), E(A,B′) = E(A)E(B′) and E(A′, B′) = E(A′)E(B′), and hence from the lemma it follows
that −2 ≤ E(A′B′) + E(A′B) + E(AB′) − E(AB) ≤ +2, which proves the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt
variant of Bell’s inequalities to be valid.
The foregoing considerations show that one of the elements in the violation of Bell’s inequalities is the
non-product nature of the probabilities P (Ai, Bj), P (A
′
i, Bj), P (Ai, B
′
j) and P (A
′
i, B
′
j), e.g., P (Ai, Bj) 6=
P (Ai)P (Bj). If we understand why these coincidence probabilities are not of the product nature we can
get an insight into one of the elements of the violation of Bell’s inequalities for the situations that we have
considered. Indeed, consider for example the probability P (A1, B1) and let us analyze why it is different
from P (A1)P (B1). We have that P (A1, B1) is the probability, empirically estimated, that a given test
subject choose the sentence The Horse Growls as a good example of the concept The Animal Acts, and
then we find P (A1, B1) = 0.0494. On the contrary, P (A1)P (B1) is the probability that, of two given test
subjects, the first choose Horse as a good example of Animal and the other choose independently Growls as
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a good example of Acts, and then we find P (A1)P (B1) = 0.2556. These values are very different. Indeed,
the probability to find the sentence part The Horse Growls is little, for any meaning this sentence may
have will not be easily ascertained, since it is most unusual for horses to growl. If however two ‘separated’
or ‘independent’ subjects are chosen at random, the probability that Horse be chosen by one of them, and
Growls be chosen by the other, is substantial. The fundamental reason for this difference is that in the
second case the choices are ‘separated’ or ‘independent’ or, rather, ‘not connected by meaning’.
The results above show that ‘meaning’ plays a fundamental role in determining the experimental weights
of the examples of concept combinations. But, there are stronger arguments to maintain that context and
meaning are crucial in human thought, hence a combination of concepts is not like a ‘bag of words’, as
implied by the mathematical structure of existing semantic theories, e.g., LSA.
Let us calculate the data that would have been obtained if the minds of the test subjects had not
been influenced by context and meaning. Consider the coincidence experiment AB and suppose that a
given subject chooses the exemplar Horse as a good example of the concept Animal and Growls as a good
example of the concept Acts. Should context and meaning not play any role, then the subject would choose
with certainty the example The Horse Growls as a good example of the combination The Animal Acts.
We can thus evaluate the probability Pclass (A1, B1) that a given subject choose Horse in the experiment A
and Growls in the experiment B. It is given by Pclass(A1, B1) = 19/81 = 0.2346, where 19 is the number of
subjects who chose Horse in the experimentA andGrowls in the experimentB. This probability can be used
as an estimation of the probability that a given subject choose The Horse Growls as a good example of The
Animal Acts. We can repeat the same reasoning for the other possible results in the coincidence experiment
AB, thus getting Pclass (A2, B2) = 0.2222, Pclass (A1, B2) = 0.2963 and Pclass(A2, B1) = 0.2469. Hence the
expectation value is Eclass(A,B) = Pclass (A1, B1)+Pclass (A2, B2)−Pclass (A1, B2)−Pclass (A2, B1) = −0.0864
in this case. Analogously, we get Eclass(A
′, B) = 0.1235, Eclass (A,B
′) = −0.0123 and Eclass(A
′, B′) =
−0.1111 for the expectation values of the other coincidence experiments. The ‘classical’ expectation values
Eclass(A,B), Eclass(A
′, B), Eclass (A,B
′) and Eclass(A
′, B′) can then be inserted into the Bell inequality,
which gives
Eclass(A
′, B′) + Eclass(A
′, B) + Eclass (A,B
′)− Eclass(A,B) = 0.0864. (4)
As we can see, the obtained value does not violate Bell’s inequalities. As a consequence, the violation of
Bell’s inequalities in the experiment that we have considered can be interpreted as proving that meaning
and context are fundamental for the mechanism of construction of sentences.
To conclude this section we observe that we also performed a statistical analysis of the empirical data
using the ‘t-test for paired two samples for means’ to estimate the probability that the shifts from Bell’s
inequalities be due to chance. We compared the data collected in the real experiment with the data
collected in the ‘classical’ experiment, where no influence of context and meaning is present. For the 16
pairs to compare the p-values came out as follows: 0.000392657, 0.003921785, 2.50665E-06, 0.820174295,
3.8846E-08, 0.011513803, 4.78134E-05, 0.741136115, 2.35428E-08, 0.000152291, 1.3612E-08, 0.006518053,
0.073431676, 7.38957E-12, 3.8846E-08, 0.56693215. This makes it possible to conclude convincingly that
the deviation effects are not caused by random fluctuations.
4 Explanation of entanglement in concepts
A fundamental consequence of the experimental results obtained in Sec. 3 is that any formalism aiming
at representing concepts should incorporate the possibility of having entangled concepts from the very
beginning. In order to understand in depth the mechanism of entanglement between concepts together
with the causes of its ubiquity, we put forward an analysis of the situation in this section with the aim of
grasping the core element of entanglement for concept combinations.
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Consider the concept Animal. This concept is an ‘abstraction’ of possible concrete exemplars of Ani-
mal, e.g., Horse, Bear, Tiger, Cat, etc. When we ask a subject to estimate whether a given example, say,
Horse is a ‘good example’ of the concept Animal this operation corresponds to ‘wandering into the realm
of abstraction and concretization’. The concept Animal is then connected with the exemplars of Animal by
weights, expressing frequencies of appearance and/or typicalities of the different exemplars. Analogously,
the concept Acts is an abstraction of possible concrete exemplars of Acts, and also connected to these dif-
ferent exemplars by weights, expressing frequencies of appearance and/or typicalities. Let us now consider
the concept The Animal Acts which is the combination of Animal and Acts. This is also an abstraction of
possible exemplars. In the situation that we considered for the experiment the concrete exemplars are The
Horse Growls, The Tiger Meows, etc.. But, the weight of, say, The Horse Growls is not the product of the
weight of Horse in Animal times the weight of Growls in Acts in this case, otherwise Bell’s inequalities would
have been satisfied. It follows that the essential element being at the origin of entanglement is that ‘when
concepts combine they do this inside the realm of where they exist as abstractions’. With other words,
the combination The Animal Acts, is a combination of two abstractions Animal and Acts, but it does not
connect with the concrete elements, i.e. the exemplars of Animal and Acts. No, it connects with its own set
of exemplars, such a The Horse Whinnies or The Bear Growls, etc., which are in themselves combinations
of exemplars of the original concepts, but even this is not necessary, also completely new exemplars can
be considered for the combination. This is a very different way of combining than for example the way in
which two classical physical object combine. Hence, entanglement is a direct and deep consequence of this
special way of combining, for each combination choosing its own set of new exemplars, ‘with new weight
specifically linked to the individual exemplars’, and not connecting to the product set of the old exemplars
and corresponding weights. That concepts have this special way of combining in common with quantum
entities might not be a coincidence, a hypothesis investigated in [19].
A consequence of the above analysis is that entanglement in concepts does not strictly depend on the
linearity of the tensor product Hilbert space that can be used to model the entity The Animal Acts – we
remind that the Tsirelson inequalities [31] hold in the specific case that we have considered, therefore a
purely quantum model can be worked out in this case. Moreover, the type of model in Hilbert space that
we would expect is the following. Let us denote the states of the concepts Animal and Acts by the unit
vectors |pAnimal 〉 and |pActs〉, respectively. Since Animal and Acts are both abstractions of, say, Horse and
Bear and of Growls and Whinnies, respectively, we have
|pAnimal 〉 = a1|pH〉+ a2|pB〉, |pActs〉 = b1|pG〉+ b2|pW 〉 (5)
where |a1|
2 and |a2|
2, and |b1|
2 and |b2|
2, respectively, are the weights that both concretizations carry,
and the unit vectors |pH〉, |pB〉, |pG〉 and |pW 〉 represent the states pHorse , pBear , pGrowls and pWhinnies ,
respectively. The ground state pThe Animal Acts of the combination The Animal Acts, being an abstraction
of ‘all combinations of the concrete cases’, is then represented by the unit vector
|pThe Animal Acts〉 = c1|pHG〉+ c2|pBW 〉+ c3|pHW 〉+ c4|pBG〉, (6)
where the unit vectors |pHG〉, |pBW 〉, |pHW 〉 and |pBG〉 represent the states pThe Horse Growls , pThe Bear Whinnies ,
pThe Horse Whinnies and pThe Bear Growls , respectively. Eq. (6) is not, in general, a product, hence it is not
equal to the tensor product |pAnimal 〉 ⊗ |pActs〉, which is the mathematical basis of the presence of entan-
glement.
The unavoidability of entanglement could explain the difficulties that scholars encounter in putting
forward a modeling scheme for concepts and their combinations in which individual concepts are represented
by a unique mathematical structure, e.g., vectors such as in LSA, without introducing the tensor product
structure (see, e.g., [32]).
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